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"Watching the Watchmen" After
Termination of Injunctive Relief*
Elizabeth Alexandert
I. Introduction
About four years ago, I attended a conference sponsored by
the Council of Europe in which delegates from various Euro-
pean Union countries discussed how to assure decent and hu-
mane conditions in their prisons, pursuant to their obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights. I learned
that these countries generally use one of two models to satisfy
these obligations. One model relies on an agency within the
prison authority that is charged with assuring that conditions
in the prisons and jails comply with the convention, and a sec-
ond model relies on some form of an ombudsman outside the
direct control of the prison authority.
Both models-the insider model and the ombudsman
model-have a potential problem, but it is not the same prob-
lem. The potential problem for supervision when the monitor is
part of the prison agency itself is a lack of will to assure compli-
ant conditions because of the danger that the monitor will be
captured by the prison agency. In contrast, the problem for
those countries relying on an ombudsman system is typically
not a lack of will but a lack of power, since the ombudsman gen-
erally lacks the authority to order changes in the agency.
In the United States, since the 1970's, we have relied al-
most exclusively on a third possible model for preventing abuse
in prisons, and that mechanism is the federal courts. We know
that the model of reform through the courts can work because it
has worked in the United States.1 It makes sense that the
* "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" (Who shall watch the watchmen
themselves?) JUVENAL, SATIRES, VI, 347.
t Elizabeth Alexander is the Director of the National Prison Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.
1. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAK-
ING AND THE MODERN STATE, How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS
793
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
model of prison reform through the courts can work and has
worked in this country, because the federal courts potentially
possess the two characteristics of will and power that are neces-
sary to control prison abuse: they unquestionably have the
power, and under the right circumstances they have the will,
because they are independent both of the state governments
and the federal executive branch.
These observations necessarily lead me to have some seri-
ous questions about the efficacy of maintaining prison reform in
the aftermath of litigation. It is possible that the former de-
fendants, after termination of court supervision, may have the
will to maintain constitutional conditions, and I look forward to
Carl Reynolds' remarks about how the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice is attempting to maintain accountability in
the aftermath of its major state-wide prison conditions litiga-
tion; Ruiz v. Johnson.2 At a minimum, however, maintaining
accountability by virtue of internal monitoring devices is contin-
gent upon the decision of the head of the agency to maintain
internal monitoring and upon the monitoring arm's ability to
avoid capture.
II. Leaving Monitoring Mechanisms in Place
The question of how to assure the persistence of reform of
prison conditions has taken on added urgency since the 1996
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).3 One
section of PLRA now requires termination of injunctive relief
affecting prison conditions, upon a motion by a defendant, un-
less a "current and ongoing" violation of federal law exists. 4 In
other words, the only injunctive orders regarding prison condi-
tions that a federal court may retain are those that have been
ineffective to eliminate the constitutional or statutory violation.
(1998); Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 639 (1993).
2. 154 F. Supp. 2d 975, 980-84 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (detailing a history of the
case). The final termination order is unpublished. See Carl Reynolds, Effective
Self-Monitoring of Correctional Conditions, 24 PACE L. REV. 769 (2004).
3. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915,
1915A; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997h).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2003).
[Vol. 24:793
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This standard is a substantial departure from previous doc-
trine regarding the point at which an injunction may be termi-
nated. The Supreme Court provided guidance to lower courts
on standards for ending court-ordered injunctive relief in Board
of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell:5
In the present case, a finding by the District Court that the
Oklahoma City School District was being operated in compliance
with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and that it was unlikely that the school board
would return to its former ways, would be a finding that the pur-
poses of the desegregation litigation had been fully achieved. No
additional showing of "grievous wrong evoked by new and unfore-
seen conditions" is required of the school board.6
Congress' elimination, in PLRA, of any requirement that
the defendants demonstrate that the constitutional violation is
unlikely to return means that plaintiffs in prison conditions
cases are likely to see injunctive relief terminated much earlier
than it would have been under previous law. Accordingly, it is
critical for plaintiffs' counsel to attempt to maintain meaningful
checks against abuse after injunctive relief has terminated.
Logically there are two kinds of things that plaintiffs' counsel
can try. The first category involves setting up mechanisms to
limit abuses prior to the end of litigation, and several judges
have included requirements for such mechanisms in their or-
ders granting termination.7
Sometimes the plaintiffs' counsel can reach agreement with
defendants to leave such mechanisms in place. For example, in
Cody v. Hillard,8 a South Dakota prison case, the settlement
agreement allowed plaintiffs' counsel to monitor conditions for
three years after dismissal, required annual fire and life safety
surveys by the South Dakota fire marshal and annual work
place safety inspections by the South Dakota Office of Risk
5. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
6. Id. at 247.
7. See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, No. 80-CV-73581 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2001)
(order of termination); United States v. Michigan, No. 90-1701 (W.D. Mich. May 1,
1990) (unpublished order). I served as counsel for plaintiffs in Hadix and as coun-
sel for amicus curiae in United States v. Michigan.
8. See Cody v. Hillard, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D.S.D. 2000) (order approving
settlement agreement). I served as counsel for plaintiffs in this case.
20041
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Management. 9 For medical care, the parties agreed that a spec-
ified continuous quality improvement program would be inter-
nally maintained. Since these were the three areas where the
defendants had previously experienced the most difficulties in
compliance, these were the most important areas to provide for
a monitoring mechanism. 10
I am least confident that the monitoring left in place for
medical care will be effective, despite the fact that the defend-
ants were accredited by the National Commission on Correc-
tional Health Care (NCCHC). Indeed, I am generally skeptical,
based on my experience with accredited facilities, that accredi-
tation by either the American Correctional Association (ACA) or
by the NCCHC is of great value. Although these are the two
most widely known organizations that inspect and accredit cor-
rectional agencies and programs, accreditation by neither body
assures the maintenance of constitutional conditions. 1 At least
in some jurisdictions, local or state agencies that routinely per-
9. The South Dakota Office of Risk Management performs inspections similar
to those conducted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA).
10. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement Agree-
ment and Approval of Notice to the Class, Cody v. Hillard, (D.S.D. Mar. 15, 1999)
(No. 80-4039).
11. The federal courts have frequently recognized that accreditation by agen-
cies such as the NCCHC does not guarantee the existence of constitutional stan-
dards. See Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 924 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir.
2001) ("One of the recurring themes of the evidence presented in the hearing was
that constitutional policies do not necessarily ensure constitutional practices.
While NCCHC accreditation does bolster defendants' claims that its medical care
system is functioning constitutionally, the accreditation simply cannot be disposi-
tive of such a conclusion."); Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Poundstone, 985 F. Supp.
1356, 1429 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (stating that accreditation by Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is not equivalent to, or a sub-
stitute for, compliance with either the consent decree at issue or with minimal
constitutional standards); Robbins v. Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479, 1481 (D.N.M.
1990) (stating that accreditation by JCAHO "is by no means an assurance that
abuse and neglect of patients does not take place in an institution, or that patients'
constitutional and statutory rights are being protected"); LaMarca v. Turner, 662
F. Supp. 647, 655 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (stating that accreditation by the American Cor-
rectional Association (ACA) has "virtually no significance" to lawsuit because ac-
credited prisons have been found unconstitutional by the courts); Boulies v.
Ricketts, 518 F. Supp. 687, 689 (D. Colo. 1981) (rejecting argument that accredita-
tion by ACA entitled defendants to summary judgment on claim of constitutional
inadequacy of law library as "simply ludicrous"); Russell v. Johnson, 2003 LEXIS
8576, at *4, 2003 WL 22208029, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May 21, 2003) (stating that ACA
796
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form monitoring in the community, such as the fire department
or the health department, may be preferable to national agen-
cies that specialize in corrections because agencies that rou-
tinely monitor comparable community activities are more likely
to apply reasonable standards to conditions than are national
organizations run and funded in substantial part by the correc-
tional agencies they accredit, and staffed by professionals with
close ties to corrections agencies.
III. Reopening Cases Under Rule 60(b)(6)
The second category of actions that plaintiffs' counsel can
take obviously involves actions subsequent to termination.
There are no reported cases in which, following termination of
an injunction pursuant to PLRA, plaintiffs have attempted to
reopen the judgment because the unconstitutional conditions
have returned, but this is a litigation strategy that deserves
exploration.
This issue is particularly important because the provisions
in PLRA regarding the termination of injunctions have been in-
terpreted by the federal courts to require termination of injunc-
tions whenever there is no current and on-going constitutional
or statutory violation, regardless of the likelihood that the viola-
tion will return shortly after injunctive relief is terminated. 12
Accordingly, as written, PLRA apparently requires a federal
court to terminate an injunction even if the defendants an-
nounce their intention to revert to their previous actions as soon
as the court has acted. Indeed, a legislative report regarding
this provision suggests that Congress intended for injunctive re-
accreditation neither mooted constitutional challenge to conditions on death row,
nor showed that conditions met constitutional standards).
12. See Para-Profl Law Clinic at SCI-Graterford v. Beard, 334 F.3d 301, 304
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that under PLRA only a violation of law existing at the time
a court hears a defendant's motion to terminate relief will prevent termination,
even if a future violation of law is likely); Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d
339, 353 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F. 3d 777, 783-84 (11th
Cir. 2000) (same); see also Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1009 n.27 (9th Cir.
2000) (stating that in PLRA Congress intended to require federal courts to termi-
nate injunctive relief even if a constitutional violation is imminent).
20041
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lief to terminate even if the defendants were "poised to resume
a prior violation of federal rights.' 13
If a constitutional violation returns after a defendants' mo-
tion for termination pursuant to PLRA has been granted, the
plaintiffs can seek to vacate the judgment of dismissal by filing
a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 60(b),
which codifies the power of federal courts to modify final judg-
ments in civil cases. Ordinarily motions to modify final injunc-
tive relief are filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). This section,
however, envisions relief if "it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application .... ,,14 Once an
injunction has been terminated, it no longer has prospective ap-
plication, so this section cannot be used to restore a previously
terminated injunction. 15
Because Rule 60(b)(5) is inapplicable, a plaintiff who seeks
to restore an injunction after a PLRA termination motion has
been granted will be required to proceed under Rule 60(b)(6),
which is the catch-all clause allowing alteration of a judgment
based on "any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment."1 6 The first requirement for relief under Rule
60(b)(6) is a demonstration that relief is unavailable under any
other provision of Rule 60.17 In light of the unavailability of re-
13. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-405, at 133 (1997). The original provision of
PLRA had provided that injunctive relief would not terminate if there was a "cur-
rent or ongoing" violation of law. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Ap-
propriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802(b)(3), 110 Stat. 1321 (1998).
The 1997 amendments changed this language to mandate termination unless a
"current and ongoing" violation of law existed. Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-119, § 123(a)(2), 111 Stat. 2440 (1997).
14. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(5).
15. See Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 8 F.3d 1501, 1509 (10th
Cir. 1993) (observing that Rule 60(b)(5) could not be used to reinstate terminated
injunction in school desegregation case; plaintiffs had to meet the higher standard
of Rule 60(b)(6)); Lee v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1426, 1433 (11th
Cir. 1992) (holding that an order that implicitly dissolved an injunction was not an
order with prospective application, so that Rule 60(b)(5) was inapplicable); Twelve
John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[It is difficult
to see how an unconditional dismissal could ever have prospective application
within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5).").
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
17. See Liljeberg v. Health Sers. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 & n.11
(1988) (stating that Rule 60(b)(6) grants federal courts authority to provide relief
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/19
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lief under Rule 60(b)(5), discussed above, this demonstration is
easy.'8
The other requirement for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is a
showing of "extraordinary circumstances" justifying relief from
the judgment.' 9 As it happens, one class of cases in which the
federal courts have considered whether "extraordinary circum-
stances" justify relief under this section has involved claims
that the non-moving party failed to carry out duties under a set-
tlement agreement. While there are differences among the cir-
cuits regarding the circumstances under which relief may be
obtained under the Rule when a settlement agreement is vio-
lated after dismissal, none of these cases suggests that reopen-
ing is barred if the settlement agreement has been incorporated
into a court order, or otherwise made enforceable. Moreover,
there are strong suggestions from the Supreme Court that re-
opening is available under the rule when the settlement agree-
ment has been incorporated into a court order.
Indeed, several circuits have allowed reopening under Rule
60(b)(6) when the district court had not provided for enforce-
ment of the settlement prior to dismissal. In Keeling v. Sheet
from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) only when relief is not available under any
other provision of Rule 60(b)).
18. The first four sections of Rule 60(b) provide for relief in the following
circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore de-
nominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party; [or] (4) the judgment is void ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(4).
Whether the return of unconstitutional conditions is a surprise or involved misrep-
resentation by defendants at the time of dismissal of the previous injunction is
irrelevant because the predictability of a return of such conditions would have
been irrelevant to termination. Nor is the second provision regarding newly dis-
covered evidence relevant, because this section of Rule 60 is designed to provide
relief if it is likely that the judgment would have been different based on evidence
that existed at the time of trial. See United States v. McGaughey, 977 F.2d 1067,
1075 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating requirement that evidence existed at time of trial as
one element of test for relief under Rule 60(b)(2)); Jones v. Aero/Chem. Corp., 921
F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 1990) (same). In circumstances in which the constitutional
violation returned only after dismissal of injunctive relief, this section will provide
no relief. A judgment obtained by defendants pursuant to PLRA is also, of course,
neither fraudulent nor void.
19. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863-64.
7
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Metal Workers International Ass'n, Local Union 162,20 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court order granting relief
under the rule, reasoning that consistent non-compliance with
the terms of the settlement agreement, which had the effect of
frustrating the purpose of the agreement, constituted an "excep-
tional circumstance." 21 Keeling is a puzzling decision because it
also states that ordinarily, upon repudiation of a settlement
agreement, the non-breaching party's recourse is a new suit for
breach of contract and that party "may not, as here, reopen the
underlying litigation after dismissal."22 For that proposition,
Keeling cites an earlier Ninth Circuit case, 23 but nothing in that
case supports the proposition that ordinarily non-compliance
with a settlement agreement must be addressed through a new
breach of contract suit.24 Moreover, Keeling says the following:
"Repudiations of a settlement agreement that terminated litiga-
tion pending before a court constitutes an extraordinary circum-
stance, and it justifies vacating the court's prior dismissal
order."25
The Sixth Circuit, in Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co.,26 simi-
larly held that the court below correctly exercised its discretion
in vacating an order of dismissal based on a party's attempted
repudiation of a settlement. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in
dicta indicated that it was the duty of the court to enforce the
agreement.27 The language in Aro Corp. is far-reaching; the
court endorsed resort to Rule 60(b)(6) without applying the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" test or investigating whether a re-
20. 937 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991).
21. Id. at 410.
22. Id.
23. TNT Mktg., Inc. v. Agresti, 796 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1986), cited in Keeling,
937 F.2d at 410.
24. TNT Mktg., Inc., 796 F.2d at 278. This case involved enforcement of a
stipulated judgment in a contempt proceeding and it discusses neither reopening
under Rule 60 nor breach of contract suits.
25. Keeling, 937 F.2d at 410 (citations omitted). Perhaps the court is distin-
guishing between cases involving general claims that the opposing party breached
a settlement agreement and cases in which the party opposing reopening admits a
deliberate breach.
26. 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1976).
27. Id. at 1371. As noted infra, these dicta are inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's later decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380-81
(1994), holding that a district court does not have inherent power to enforce a set-
tlement agreement. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24:793800
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sort to Rule 60 was unnecessary because of the availability of an
alternative remedy for breach of contract.28 The Sixth Circuit
specifically rejected the argument that the settlement agree-
ment was a contract between non-diverse parties, so that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce it, and thus any
breach of the contract should be determined by state courts.
29
Accordingly, the decision sub silentio rejects an argument that
the existence of a remedy through an independent breach of
contract suit is relevant to the availability of relief under Rule
60(b)(6).
In Fairfax Countywide Citizens v. Fairfax County,30 the
Fourth Circuit reviewed a case in which the district court had
vacated a dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and enforced a
settlement agreement. The Court of Appeals began its opinion
by announcing its agreement with the Sixth Circuit in Aro
Corp. that, upon repudiation of a settlement agreement that
had terminated litigation, a district court has the authority
under Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate its prior dismissal and restore the
case to the docket.31 The court disagreed, however, with the
Sixth Circuit that a district court has a general inherent power
to enforce a settlement agreement. 32 Because the settlement
agreement at issue had not been incorporated into a court or-
der, and because there was no independent basis for federal ju-
risdiction over the settlement agreement,33 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court to vacate the dismissal
but reversed its order enforcing the settlement.
34
In a later case, the Fourth Circuit considered a variant of
the problem of enforcing a settlement agreement after dismis-
sal. After a settlement and dismissal in Vincent v. Reynolds
Memorial Hospital, Inc.,35 the state courts invalidated the set-
tlement agreement as against public policy. Notwithstanding
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. 571 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1978).
31. Id. at 1302-03.
32. Id. at 1303. As indicated in supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text,
this aspect of the decision in Fairfax Countywide Citizens correctly anticipated
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-81.
33. Id. The reasoning of the Fourth Circuit is also consistent with the Su-
preme Court's later decision in Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-381.
34. Fairfax Countywide Citizens, 571 F.2d at 1306.
35. 728 F.2d 250 (4th xCir. 1984).
20041
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that fact, the district court refused to vacate the dismissal of the
case. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that relief should
have been granted pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6); since no action for
breach of the agreement was available, the moving party should
have been allowed to reopen the federal litigation.36
In contrast, in Harman v. Pauley,37 the Fourth Circuit, ap-
plying a discretionary "interests of justice" standard refused to
vacate a dismissal when the movant alleged that only one of the
opposing parties had breached the settlement, the movant had
already instituted a breach of contract action against that
party, and the movant did not suggest any reason why a breach
of contract action was an inadequate remedy.38
Similarly, in Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc.,39 the Third Circuit
stated that the "extraordinary circumstances" required to jus-
tify reopening of a judgment could not be shown simply by a
showing that the opposing party had breached a settlement
agreement, in light of the availability of a new action for breach
of contract. 40 At the same time, however, the Third Circuit dis-
tinguished its earlier case of Kelly v. Greer.41 In that case, re-
opening to enforce a settlement had been granted, but the
settlement agreement had been read into the record, a circum-
stance that "evidenc[ed] an intent that the court [would] con-
tinue to actively supervise performance." 42 Accordingly, the
ground upon which the Third Circuit distinguished Kelly sug-
gests that "extraordinary circumstances" can be shown where a
settlement that has been incorporated into an order of the court
is involved.
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. ,43 the Supreme
Court held that, absent some independent basis for federal ju-
risdiction, a federal court cannot enforce a settlement agree-
36. Id. at 251.
37. 678 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1982).
38. Id. at 481-82.
39. 989 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 140-41.
41. 334 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1964).
42. Sawka, 989 F.2d at 141 n.3. After the Supreme Court's decision in Kok-
konen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994), see infra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text, it is clear that reading the settlement agreement into the re-
cord did not make the agreement enforceable. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381.
43. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
802 [Vol. 24:793
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ment unless the agreement had been incorporated into a court
order, or the court had explicitly retained jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement. 44 The decision in Kokkonen does not directly ad-
dress the propriety of reopening a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)
because of a party's failure to comply with a settlement agree-
ment.45 The logic of the decision in Kokkonen, however, sup-
ports the argument that when a settlement agreement has been
incorporated into a court order, the court can grant relief under
Rule 60(b)(6) if the order is breached:
The situation would be quite different if the parties' obligation to
comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been
made part of the order of dismissal-either by separate provision
(such as a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement
agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agree-
ment in the order. In that event, a breach of the agreement would
be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the
agreement would therefore exist.
46
This reasoning necessarily envisions that, if a court incor-
porated a settlement agreement into an order and then dis-
missed the case, enforcement of the settlement would require a
reopening of the case and thus recourse to Rule 60(b).
This reading of Kokkonen is consistent with the First Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Baus,47 in which that court
reversed a district court's refusal to grant relief and held that
the defendants were entitled to a hearing on their allegations
that the United States had breached a stipulated judgment.
The court characterized as "well-accepted" the principle that
material breach of a settlement agreement incorporated into a
court judgment entitles the non-breaching party to relief under
Rule 60(b)(6) and it emphasized that, absent such relief,
"[mlaterial breach of such a solemn obligation presents an ex-
traordinary situation of permitting a party to benefit from a
judgment the terms of which it has deliberately disregarded."48
44. Id. at 380-81.
45. The Court does note that there is a split of authority among the circuits
regarding the propriety of reopening a settlement agreement under the Rule. See
id. at 378.
46. Id. at 381.
47. 834 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 1124.
8032004]
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Baus appears to be the only Court of Appeals case regard-
ing reopening of a dismissal of a commercial settlement agree-
ment that had been incorporated into a court judgment. In
consent judgments contemplating complex injunctive relief, in-
cluding consent judgments providing for injunctive relief in
prison cases, the court entering the judgment does not typically
dismiss the case.49  Not surprisingly, then, there are no cases
involving an attempt to reopen a case settled through agree-
ment to an enforceable complex injunction when the case had
been dismissed immediately subsequent to the settlement.
The only appellate decision involving an attempt to reopen
a complex injunction dismissed following a finding of compli-
ance is Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City,50 in
which the Court of Appeals, without describing the plaintiffs'
arguments, summarily held that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify
relief under Rule 60(b)(6).51
Differences between the plaintiffs' unsuccessful motion in
Dowell and motions to reopen injunctions terminated because of
PLRA suggest that courts might be significantly more respon-
sive to such motions in PLRA cases. As noted above, absent the
PLRA, the law does not require the termination of an injunction
simply because the defendants have currently and temporarily
achieved compliance. 52 The PLRA requirement that injunctive
relief terminate unless the court finds the existence of a current
and ongoing constitutional violation suggests that a court would
be required to terminate relief even if the court were certain
that the day following dismissal the defendants would return to
their unconstitutional practices.53
In Gilmore v. California, the Ninth Circuit considered an
argument that this provision of PLRA violated the constitu-
49. See, e.g., Cody v. Hillard, No. 80-4039 (D.S.D. July 8, 1985) (retaining ju-
risdiction to enforce the consent decree); Hadix v. Johnson, No. 80-73581 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 13, 1985) (consent decree); see also Hadix v. Johnson, (E.D. Mich. May
13, 1985) (consent decree providing that the court retains jurisdiction for enforce-
ment accepted by court).
50. 8 F.3d 1501 (10th Cir. 1993). This is a later stage of the litigation in
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
51. Dowell, 8 F.3d at 1509.
52. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 54-56, 64-68 and accompanying text.
804 [Vol. 24:793
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tional requirement of separation of powers "by preventing the
courts from providing the remedy necessary to prevent rever-
sion to past unconstitutional practices."54 The Court of Appeals
characterized the challenge to the provision as "serious" 55 but
declined to address the argument on the ground that, because
the court was for other reasons remanding the case to the dis-
trict court, the plaintiffs' claim of a constitutional violation ex-
isted could be explored by the district court. By the time of
remand, the "imminent" violation alleged by the plaintiffs
might have come into existence; if it had not materialized, the
plaintiffs' argument would be moot.56 While superficially ap-
pealing, the court's analysis does not dispose of one plausible
set of circumstances. It could be that the constitutional viola-
tion is "imminent" in the sense that it will return as soon as the
injunction is lifted, although it will not return as long as the
injunction remains in place.
If a constitutional violation returned after injunctive relief
was terminated pursuant to the PLRA, the plaintiffs theoreti-
cally would be able to file a new lawsuit seeking relief from the
renewed constitutional violation. In practice, however, they
could be unable to seek a new injunction from the federal courts
for many months because a separate provision of PLRA prohib-
its federal courts from entertaining suits challenging prison
conditions of confinement until the plaintiffs have exhausted
available administrative remedies.57 A prisoner generally must
go through several levels of administrative appeals to obtain an
administrative decision, and there is no requirement in PLRA
that the grievance system provide a final decision in any partic-
ular amount of time.58 Accordingly, the separation of powers
54. Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1009 n.27 (9th Cir. 2000); see also
Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981) (arguing that, when constitutional rights are at
stake, Congress must not limit the powers of the federal courts in a manner that
leaves them with authority "to grant only plainly inadequate relief').
55. Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 1009 n.27.
56. Id.
57. This provision of PLRA is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996).
58. See id. The Seventh Circuit has held that grievance system determina-
tions that a prisoner has waived filing a grievance are binding on the federal
courts, so that a prisoner whose grievance is rejected administratively can never
file a federal lawsuit. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002), cert.
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problems posed by application of PLRA stem not simply from
the requirement that relief terminate even if a violation is cer-
tain to return, but from the prohibition on new litigation for an
unspecified period of time that is entirely determined by the
prison authority.59
The combination of the requirement that federal courts
must terminate injunctive relief, even when the resumption of
constitutional violations is certain, with the requirement that
prisoners can be indefinitely delayed in gaining access to a fed-
eral forum to address their federal constitutional claims raises
serious constitutional questions because of the severe restric-
tions that PLRA places on the remedial powers of the federal
courts.
60
These questions can be avoided by recognizing that the re-
turn of constitutional violations is an "extraordinary circum-
stance" that justifies reopening of the dismissal of previous
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). In the absence of the availabil-
ity of relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the potential constitutional
questions would be particularly serious because there is no real-
istic alternative remedy available to the plaintiffs that will
grant them immediate access to a federal forum; a new lawsuit
could not be filed until the plaintiffs have succeeded in exhaust-
ing available administrative remedies.
Although I have relied on cases involving settlement agree-
ments in support of the argument that Rule 60(b)(6) should be
available to reopen relief when constitutional violations return,
court-ordered relief subject to termination under PLRA can in-
volve injunctive relief resulting from either litigation or a settle-
ment. The distinction between the two is of little relevance for
denied, 537 U.S. 949 (2002); see also Steele v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Serv.,
2000 LEXIS 17031, 2000 WL 777931 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2000) (dismissing case for
non-exhaustion because prisoner had engaged in "deliberate bypass" by failing to
file a grievance, even though he was out of the facility for the entire period in
which he could have filed, because the grievance system provided for late filings in
"extreme circumstances").
59. But see Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta
that PLRA's exhaustion provision does not preclude courts from exercising their
traditional equitable powers to prevent irreparable injury pending exhaustion of
administrative remedies); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 268 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (same).
60. See supra notes 4, 13, 54 and accompanying text.
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the purposes of determining the applicability of Rule 60(b)(6), 61
because the relevant "extraordinary circumstance" is the de-
fendants' failure to live up to court-ordered responsibilities.
Courts that have considered violation of a settlement not
incorporated into a court order to constitute an "extraordinary
circumstance" justifying relief can scarcely hold that violation of
a court order is a less serious act. Accordingly, existing author-
ity from the courts of appeals regarding reopening of dismissals
based on settlement agreements, as well as general considera-
tions regarding Rule 60(b)(6), supports the conclusion that the
return of constitutional violations following termination of relief
under PLRA can constitute an "extraordinary circumstance"
justifying relief under the rule. Indeed, as the First Circuit em-
phasized in United States v. Baus, 62 it is the fact that a party
violated a judgment that creates the "extraordinary
circumstance." 63
An example of a case that would present the most compel-
ling arguments for reopening under Rule 60(b) is suggested by
the Third Circuit's opinion in Para-Professional Law Clinic at
SCI-Graterford v. Beard.64 In that case, the court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's termination, pursuant to PLRA, of in-
junctive relief requiring the defendants to maintain a prison
law clinic in order to provide prisoners with access to the courts.
The plaintiffs offered deposition testimony by the Secretary of
Corrections that he intended to close the clinic at some point in
the future.65 Because the plaintiffs nonetheless conceded that
while the clinic remained opened, there was no constitutional
violation, the court of appeals held that PLRA required termi-
nation.66 At the same time, the court of appeals "encourage[d]
defendants in the strongest possible terms to reconsider any
plan they may have to close the Clinic,' 67 and noted that closing
61. In either case, in light of the requirements of PLRA, the relief would be
enforced only to the extent that its violation produced a current and ongoing con-
stitutional violation.
62. 834 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1987).
63. Id. at 1124.
64. 334 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 304 n.1.
66. Id. at 304-05.
67. Id. at 305 (footnote omitted).
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the clinic would be likely to result in additional intervention
from the federal courts.68
If the defendants were nonetheless to close the clinic, al-
lowing the constitutional violation to return, the prisoners
should not be stripped of their constitutional rights while they
seek to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies. Nor
should federal courts be required to stand by helplessly, forced
to dismiss an existing injunction and powerless to issue a new
one while potential plaintiffs struggle with the vagaries of the
prison grievance system. The availability of Rule 60(b) in such
circumstances will substantially decrease the incentives for de-
fendants to move to terminate injunctions with the intention of
immediately resuming previous unlawful behavior.
Of course, previously cured constitutional violations can re-
turn under a variety of circumstances, and courts might be
more inclined to find "extraordinary circumstances" justifying
reopening when the defendants deliberately allowed the consti-
tutional violation to return than when the defendants inadver-
tently allowed the constitutional violation to return. The length
of elapsed time prior to the return of the violation might also
influence the court's willingness to infer that the violation was
deliberate and therefore "extraordinary."69 Regardless of the
precise circumstances, however, a court ought to view with con-
cern the claim that, although injunctive relief terminated solely
because of the cessation of a constitutional violation has now
returned, the plaintiffs have no remedy.70
68. Id. at 306.
69. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (suggesting that Keeling v. Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union 162, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991), im-
plicitly distinguishes between deliberate breaches and other breaches of a settle-
ment agreement, and that it considered only deliberate breaches to constitute
"extraordinary circumstances" justifying reopening of a final judgment).
70. In a somewhat comparable context, Congress in PLRA endorsed the con-
cept of reopening a judgment to allow plaintiffs to seek relief from violations of law
if such violations return following dismissal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2) (1997) (al-
lowing parties to enter into settlement agreements that are not limited to address-
ing constitutional or statutory violations as long as the agreement is enforceable
solely through the reinstatement of the settled case).
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IV. Conclusion
It is possible that in the future the United States will de-
velop workable alternatives to prison reform through the fed-
eral courts. Right now, however, there are no such obvious
alternatives that combine the will and power necessary to re-
form currently unconstitutional prison systems, or even to
maintain conditions in those facilities that have passed through
the judicial reform process. For that reason, it is critically nec-
essary to fashion new tools to assure that the federal courts re-
tain the remedial powers they need to enforce constitutional
mandates. One of the tools that may fill a gap in the remedial
powers of the federal courts is Rule 60(b)(6), and plaintiffs'
counsel should carefully consider its possible effectiveness when
constitutional violations return following the termination of in-
junctive relief.
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